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Grant J. Silva 
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 
 
Abstract 
This essay explores the extent to which comparative philosophy can assist decolonial struggle. In order to 
accomplish this task, I offer not only a description of philosophy's colonization but also an account of how this 
discipline remains subject to the coloniality of knowledge. In short, insofar as race, gender, class, and sexuality 
are considered irrelevant or accidental to the production of philosophical knowledge, professional philosophy 
replicates, if not continues, what Rajeev Bhargava terms the epistemic injustice of colonialism. One response to 
the colonization of philosophy is “diversification” by means of putting into conversation philosophers, systems, 
and ideas from differing cultures or regions throughout the world. While a step forward, insofar as philosophical 
comparisons occur primarily on an East–West axis, philosophers are not necessarily addressing the biases, 
prejudices, racism, and exceptionalism endemic to their discipline. In fact, such a directionality typically 
reinforces the sense of historical development that undergirds Western philosophy's self-understanding. This 
essay, therefore, offers a series of recommendations for how to radicalize comparative philosophical efforts so 
as to address global epistemic injustice and aid in the process of decolonization. 
At its most basic, explains Frantz Fanon, decolonization is the replacement of one “species” of humankind by 
another. “The substitution is unconditional, absolute, total, and seamless,” he writes, “proof of success lies in a 
social fabric that has been changed inside out.”1 The reason for this replacement should be obvious: as it stands, 
the conception of the human arising out of the European experience of colonization, which subsequently laid 
the foundation for the emergence of “modern man,” is predicated on the objectification, subjugation, 
and dehumanization of non-European peoples. Decolonization cannot mean, therefore, taking on and salvaging 
Eurocentric conceptions of humanity or the simple inversion of master and slave such that the colonized now 
dominate or view themselves as superior to the colonizer. If fully realized, decolonization results in novel ways 
of being human in the world, a replacement of the old oppressive social order with something new, a process 
through which both colonizer and colonized are changed, for it “infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new 
generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity.”2 In this novel social arrangement, Fanon 
portends, those persons once treated exclusively as things, objects manipulated for the benefit of the colonizer, 
are made “men” (“full persons” one should say) through the process of liberation. How might philosophy, 
especially “comparative philosophy,” assist in this liberatory process? 
Before answering this question, that philosophy should participate in this process needs to be made clear. After 
all, the claim can be made that philosophy, especially professionalized academic philosophy, has benefitted from 
and even been complicit in historical acts of colonization and the perpetuation of “coloniality.”3 That is to say, 
central to the “humanism” arising out of the European experience of colonization are a series of assumptions 
regarding the normative use of reason, philosophical reason in particular. Historically, these assumptions 
performed the boundary-work that delineated between the kinds of persons capable of taking part in 
philosophical inquiry and those who cannot. In the present, these assumptions supply an assortment of 
metaphilosophical and methodological limitations regarding the extent to which the particularities of human 
existence (race, class, gender, sexuality, the intersections of these, and more) can manifest in the philosophical 
process. Limitations that continue to hinder philosophy's emancipatory potential. Nevertheless, as Fanon 
explains, de‐colonization cannot be achieved by waving “a magic wand, a natural cataclysm, or gentlemen's 
agreement”; he continues, “it can only find its significance and become self coherent insofar as we discern the 
history-making movement which gives it form and substance.”4 By “history-making movement,” Fanon means 
those practices and institutions through which colonization took effect (and takes shape). Attacking those 
movements, decolonizing them, is the key to addressing the mechanisms of oppression, subjugation, and 
exclusion that further colonization. 
Philosophy, especially professional philosophy, is one such institution, or so I argue below. Thus, in order for 
decolonization to come about, the nature of philosophical practice, including the aura of sophistication, 
prestige, and civility that remains attached to it—remnants of philosophy's indebtedness to colonization—has to 
be critically examined. However, the decolonization of philosophy is no easy task. Because the episteme of 
Western philosophy is contoured by the history of modern European colonization and ideological justifications 
of it, philosophers can easily ignore and/or avoid their field's indebtedness to colonization. By “episteme” I have 
in mind the not-so-conscious background conditions and range of theoretical assumptions that make possible 
what is and what is not taken seriously within a discursive framework or knowledge community—the conditions 
for the possibility of a claim or idea being plausible or implausible within “the space of knowledge,” as put by 
Michel Foucault.5 While there is room for debate with Foucault as to whether or not epistemes are intentionally 
maintained, “the abyssal nature” of modern Western thinking, to employ the concept afforded by Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, establishes the conditions that lead to philosophy's colonization and disallow for the coloniality 
of knowledge to come into this field's purview.6 Decolonizing the episteme of Western philosophy, therefore, 
requires shining the light of reason into “the abyss,” a level of metalucidity, to borrow from José Medina, 
capable of pointing out the limitations of the “space of knowledge” as shaped by the epistemic injustice of 
colonialism.7 
For these reasons, this essay first offers an account of the colonization of philosophy such that I can 
demonstrate how the coloniality of knowledge remains in effect. This essay then returns to the question asked 
above: How might the decolonization of philosophy, aided by the promotion of comparative philosophy, assist in 
overcoming the sense of objectification Fanon is concerned with? How does “recognizing” (for lack of a better 
word) the philosophical subjectivities of nonwestern colonized peoples, both past and present, call into 
question and challenge a social order dependent not only upon on historical acts of colonization but also a 
monopolization of knowledge production and philosophical wisdom? 
Admittedly, the idea of comparative philosophy, and even cognates such as “non-Western” or “noncanonical” 
philosophy, add to the problem. As a subfield of philosophy that strives to place into conversation differing 
philosophical systems, ideas, and thinkers from diverse cultural backgrounds, this area bears much potential in 
terms of assisting decolonization and bringing about structural change within the discipline of philosophy. 
However, comparative philosophy itself stands in need of decolonial critique. This subfield is where many 
Western philosophers view the engagement with philosophical Others to be appropriate and where “diversity” 
is typically welcomed (I am tempted to say “quarantined”). The problem is, what passes for “comparative 
philosophy” takes place within the confines of a specific cartographic and geopolitical imaginary shaped by 
modern European colonization and ideological justifications for it. This imaginary situates Europe and the North 
Atlantic, and more broadly “the West,” as the center of not only the globe but also as the main protagonist of 
world history. Connected to this cartographic imaginary are forms of asymmetrical historicity, linear models of 
historical and philosophical progress, and the normalization of a particular geopolitical outlook (think about G. 
W. F. Hegel's claim that, much like Spirit's development, history travels from East to West). This outlook assumes 
normative proportions that enable some, while hindering other, comparative efforts. Usually, those 
comparisons taking place on an East-to-West directionality are welcomed. Comparisons venturing from the 
global North to the global South, say, between Europe and Africa or Latin America, or those comparisons that 
dare to even think about South-to-South relations (which includes disenfranchised voices within colonial 
metropoles and places like the United States), are undervalued if not scoffed at in professional philosophy. In 
short, the idea of comparative philosophy needs to be wrested away from a pervasive orientalism (in Edward 
Said’s sense of the term) that welcomes diversity insofar as it effectively makes no difference in the production 
of philosophical knowledge but mostly reflects the interests of those in positions of power. 
Amidst the fact that it has historically been commandeered and that diversification efforts in in philosophy are 
frequently tokenized, I maintain that treating formerly colonized peoples as philosophers, taking the idea of 
comparative philosophy seriously, and striving to build a truly global and not just globalized community of 
knowledge producers, aids in the abovementioned reconceptualization of humanity. The difference between a 
global and a globalized philosophical community prefigures much of what this essay is about, to employ the 
language of the comparative philosopher David Hall.8 As he explains, a globalized philosophical community is 
the byproduct of “Anglo-European sprawl,” an expression that I take to be quite the euphemism for the range of 
epistemic injustices that typically accompany colonialism. A global philosophical community means rethinking 
long-held assumptions and convictions about the locales, cultures, and subjectivities from which philosophical 
thought emanates. I do not just mean the promotion of philosophy from the so-called “post-” colonial world, 
but also a reconsideration of exceptionalism that undergirds Western philosophy, an exceptionalism derived 
from the false universalism afforded through conquest and cultural imposition. Decolonizing philosophy is thus a 
process through which the philosophically dispossessed, or those said to be incapable of rigorous philosophical 
thought on account of their relationship to colonization, become co-contributors to the intellectual life of 
humanity on terms that are more their own. While I do not purport to offer an exhaustive list, this essay ends by 
outlining what is necessary for comparative philosophy to play this role. 
1 The Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism 
The colonization of philosophy can be explained in a variety of ways. Each account prefigures the specific 
normative path that decolonization should take. For some philosophers, multiple, if not competing, narratives 
about the colonization of philosophy might invite skepticism and uncertainty about which narrative is correct (if 
any at all) and whether philosophy was ever really “colonized.” As sincere as this concern may be, part of what 
the decolonization of philosophy requires is a multiplicity of origin stories about philosophy's colonization in 
order to account for the variegated axes of oppression through which the coloniality of knowledge manifests. 
My account begins with what Bhargava terms the epistemic injustice of colonialism. Although brief, his views 
situate the idea of colonization within the language of epistemic injustice. While the literature on epistemic 
injustice is privy to discussions of class, race, gender, sexuality, the intersections of these, and more, much of it 
remains fairly silent on colonization's role in the creation of epistemic injustice. This is not to suggest that all 
instances of oppression that have an epistemological dimension are rooted in historical acts of colonization. 
Nevertheless, this silence is odd since the abovementioned aspects of human social identity are axes of 
oppression through which colonization and the various forms of social stratification connected to it came into 
existence. Without addressing colonization’s role in the creation of epistemic injustice, or so I argue, 
philosophers and social theorists focus on the symptoms and not a plausible source of the malady, a point that 
should serve as proof of the depths in which the episteme of Western philosophy remains steeped in the 
coloniality of knowledge. 
According to Bhargava, colonization is an injustice that unfolds economically, politically, and culturally. At the 
cultural level, colonization is typically accompanied by a unique form of epistemic injustice, “a form of cultural 
injustice that occurs when the concepts and categories by which a people understand themselves and their 
world is replaced or adversely affected by the concepts and categories of colonizers.”9 For Bhargava, the 
colonization of minds is paramount to exerting continued dominance over the colonized. As he puts it, 
colonization requires the “ceaseless drain of wealth from the colony to the metropolis. . . . Neither economic nor 
political control could have been sustained without the pervasive belief in the cultural superiority of the 
colonizers.”10 One might take issue with the claim that absent the belief in the cultural superiority of the 
colonizer it is impossible to sustain economic and political control. Sheer force and threat of violence, after all, 
are typically enough. As true as that might be, Bhargava examines a form of colonization that is equally 
damaging to the lands, bodies, culture, and minds of the colonized. This sense of colonization requires the 
thorough and complete subjugation of the colonized in order to facilitate their continuous exploitation—the 
type of colonization one finds in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean rather than the outright 
genocide and forced removal of indigenous people as in the case of the United States (this is not to say that 
genocide and forced removal from ancestral lands did not occur in Latin America or Caribbean, too). 
Bhargava recounts three ways of colonizing minds, all of which lead to feelings of inferiority, alienation, and 
despair. The first, partly outlined above, entails an abrupt and imposed change in the content of an epistemic 
framework. This particular epistemic injustice occurs when a forced alteration takes place and when a group, 
due to damage or loss, is incapable of sustaining, retrieving, or further developing its own way of thinking. Since 
epistemic frameworks are typically bound up with religious systems and linguistic practices, replacing an 
epistemic framework by forced religious conversion, the imposition of language, and alterations in formal and 
informal education are some of the vehicles for conquering minds.11 
Bhargava defines an epistemic framework as “a historically generated, collectively sustained system of meanings 
and significance, by reference to which a group understands and evaluates its individual and collective 
life.”12 Epistemic frameworks arise organically within communities. They are ways of responding to material 
and social or cultural demands and reflect the range of opinions, wisdom traditions, and critical reflective 
capabilities of a community. When no injustice occurs, epistemic frameworks are usually passed on from one 
generation to another. This is not to say, however, that the transmission of an epistemic framework is 
guaranteed, nor are they pure, pristine, self-contained, or “uncontaminated” systems. No human being or 
population group is an island unto themselves; both inter- and intracultural undercurrents and pressures shape 
the reality of any cultural group. Neither is there a single way of thinking, a solitary attitude, or essential outlook 
necessary to an epistemic framework. Instead, Bhargava's focus is on the “basic epistemic forms” of a cultural 
grouping or linguistic population. These forms are without a doubt dynamic, yet stable enough for a sense of 
identity and community to be possible. (One can easily abide by a family resemblance model for understanding 
the nature of epistemic frameworks.) 
A second epistemic injustice occurs when indigenous ways of thinking are devalued by colonizers and the 
colonized (and not necessarily replaced). “Here, the epistemic frameworks of the colonized group are still 
around, pretty much intact in a recognizable, coherent form,” writes Bhargava.13 The colonized might even 
readily identify native ways of thinking as plausible options or alternatives to the colonizer’s viewpoint. 
Nevertheless, “they are blindly rejected as worthless.”14 Worthlessness comes from eschewing central strands 
of indigenous epistemologies and simultaneous embracement of those aspects of their culture and knowledge 
systems that support or coincide with the views of the colonizer. Colonizers thereby exploit any commonalities 
they had with the colonized and reject inconvenient differences so as to facilitate uptake of the imperial way of 
thinking. One consequence of this second epistemic injustice is that it lays the foundation for the false 
universalism that (typically) undergirds colonizing cultures. That is to say, historically, a justification for modern 
European colonization was the appeal to universal history or an ability to demonstrate the type of historical 
breadth that speaks to the West’s cultural advancement and superiority. This breadth is assisted by the 
identification of commonality or “sameness” and the rejection of difference in those cultures being colonized 
(thus, as I explain below, comparative endeavors that strive to find commonality or demonstrate how “we’re all 
the same” further this particular aspect of the epistemic injustice of colonialism). 
A third variety of epistemic injustice within colonialism is the imposition of collective identity and denigration of 
any meaningful sense of individuality. “When a group encounters strangers,” Bhargava writes, “it sees them only 
as an undifferentiated mass through a crude stereotype, as if they are all the same, each merely instantiating 
the broad features shared equally by all.”15 Here, Bhargava's main concern is the blurring of individuality, 
which, one can argue, gives cultural groups the messiness and dynamism that reflects the reality of life. Instead 
of complexity, colonization offers a totalizing, homogenous, and static group identity. The end result is the loss 
of epistemic autonomy—not just the ability to think for oneself but the ability to think as a self, that is, as an 
individuated and unique person. Conjoined with the replacement and denigration of indigenous ways of 
knowing, this third injustice leaves one with a shell of an identity composed of essentialized forms lacking any 
real, particular substance. Colonized people are therefore denied an opportunity to define themselves according 
to their unique cultural and historical frame of reference and instead think as “indigenous,” “African,” “Indian,” 
“Aztec,” etc. At this juncture, one can even argue that national independence movements and nation 
formations, for instance “Mexican” or “Algerian,” continue this particular manifestation of epistemic injustice 
insofar as they require a level of homogenization that is often at odds with the reality of human life. For 
instance, although I am of indigenous ancestry, for me to think as a “Latino,” or for that matter a “Mexican-
American” or simply just as “Mexican,” means I must buy into a series of generalizations that may or may not 
reflect my ancestral history prior to the colonization of Mexico or the southwestern United States. By taking 
these social categories and ascriptions on—an unavoidable task if liberation is the goal—I am relying upon 
concepts and categories afforded through the process of colonization in the formation of my identity. 
This third epistemic injustice reveals much about the depths of colonization and the limits of overcoming it from 
a thoroughly subjugated viewpoint. The construction of ascriptive identity and social categorization are colonial 
impositions that readily supply images of what colonized peoples essentially are or should be like. These 
ascriptions obviously include normative assumptions about how the colonized “think,” if at all. The resistance to 
these generalizations typically attacks the essentialism and fixed nature of these ascriptions. Nevertheless, these 
identity formations persist. Because of the destruction of native ways of thinking about the self, the social world 
many people inhabit today, including my own, is one in which these identity formations are invested in and 
maintained by the colonized, not to mention the colonizers. This is one way that “coloniality survives 
colonialism,” to quote Nelson Maldonado-Torres: “It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic 
performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so 
many other aspects of our modern experience.” He continues, “In a way, as modern subjects we breath [sic] 
coloniality all the time and everyday.”16 I emphasize Maldonado-Torres's mentioning of subjectivity formation 
in modern contexts. Putting this into perspective, Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel speak of indigenousness as 
“an identity constructed, shaped, and lived in the political context of contemporary colonialism.”17 This is not to 
say that the tribes, clans, nations, and communities referred to as “Indigenous peoples” are not native to lands 
they inhabit. However, indigenous identity today is an “oppositional place-based existence,” one that is 
conscious of “being in struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign 
peoples.”18 Alfred and Corntassel refer to an identity that must constantly define itself against a backdrop of 
dehumanization and eradication. 
It is worth reiterating that when it comes to the epistemic injustice of colonization change itself is not bad within 
an epistemic framework. It is often the case that “paradigm shifts” or “turns” (as in the “linguistic turn”) occur 
within an epistemic framework on its own for a variety of reasons, hence why I stated above that the 
transmission of an epistemic framework is not guaranteed. The problem with colonization, however, is that 
change occurs as a result of a power differential that favors an alien way of knowing. This alien way of knowing 
is then venerated, lauded, and uplifted by means of the creation of epistemic injustice, a move that ascribes a 
sense of superiority to the colonizer’s perspective, one that, by means of erasure and elision, aids in the creation 
of a monopoly on human reason, particularly in the case of the West. 
By erasure and elision, I have in mind what Boaventura de Sousa Santos refers to “abyssal thinking.” For Santos, 
modern Western thinking: 
consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones being the foundations of the 
visible ones. The invisible distinctions are established through radical lines that divide social reality into 
two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of “the other side of the line.” The division 
is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is indeed produced 
as nonexistent. Nonexistent means not existing in any relevant or comprehensible way of being. 
Whatever is produced as nonexistent is radically excluded because it lies beyond the realm of what the 
accepted conception of inclusion considers to be its other. What most fundamentally characterizes 
abyssal thinking is thus the impossibility of the copresence of the two sides of the line. To extent that it 
prevails, this side of the line only prevails by exhausting the field of relevant reality. Beyond it, there is 
only nonexistence, invisibility, nondialectical absence.19 
 
While Santos's main focus is on the social sciences, his view helps to explain the formation of the Western 
episteme and the active forms of ignorance that undergird it. By denying colonized peoples the ability to think 
from their own vantage point, the colonizing point of view “exhausts the field of relevant reality.” The 
perspective of the colonizer becomes the only viable way of reasoning (leading to what I term epistemic 
despair). From the perspective facing the abyss, which is a standpoint inhabited by the colonizer and the 
colonized (which is why both need to be changed in order for decolonization to come into full effect), there is 
only a precipice on the other side of the thresholds of “knowledge.” As a basic and invisible line, abyssal thinking 
creates a false universalism that aims at reproducing and justifying what Santos refers to as the normative 
dualism of metropolis/colony or colonizer/colonized: “Being on the other, colonial, side of the abyssal line 
amounts to being prevented by dominant knowledge from representing the world as one’s own and in one's 
own terms.”20 In this context, the global North is the only valid source for knowledge, the South is the realm of 
ignorance; “the South is the problem; the North is the solution.”21 To shine the light of reason into “the abyss” 
would reveal the artifice and historical contingency (not to mention epistemic violence22 ) at the back of the 
Western philosophical episteme. Through abyssal thinking, however, the artifice behind “this space of 
knowledge” covers its tracks and is obscured. Notwithstanding supposed “outdated” and “inferior” ways of 
knowing, there are no viable alternatives outside the colonizer's purview. Santos's notion of abyssal thinking 
reveals the mechanisms and series of injustices that grant certain perspectives a hegemony on knowledge 
production, especially philosophical wisdom. 
Reflecting on the nature of modern philosophy can help explain the relationship between the views offered by 
Bhargava and Santos. With all of the treatises and discourses on the nature of human knowledge that fall within 
it, what is modern philosophy if not a series of apologia for the epistemic injustice of European colonization? 
How do concerns and debates over the correct method or normative procedure by which “knowledge” is 
produced arise out of a cultural milieu concerned with justifying its own advancement and supposed superiority 
(the very same cultural milieu engaged in colonial violence on the other side of the hemisphere)? 
Although metaphysical treatises are abundant during the modern era, epistemology plays a central role in this 
tradition. One possible reason for this depends upon a defining characteristic of modernity: the concern with 
and supposed awareness of human progress. In this framework the development of scientific knowledge 
became linked to the study of knowledge itself, the assumption being that improvements to the enterprise of 
the acquisition of knowledge would entail that the products of these pursuits become more “certain.” Now, 
improving epistemological standards for inquiry necessitated a restructuring of the subject enacting these 
philosophical and scientific analyses. Seeing how this meant that the subject was to become part of inquiry, the 
science of modernity articulated a theory of humanity (a self-reflective examination) as connected to the 
furtherance of knowledge. One of the implicit goals of the modern project, when viewed as a whole, is the 
creation of a humanism grounded on reason or rationality. This understanding of the human being, in turn, 
became the yardstick for comparing the cultures of the world and the foundation for the sciences that explained 
these differences in the first place. 
The impact that the experience of colonization had on the birth of the modern viewpoint can be described in the 
following way, as put by Leopoldo Zea: 
The so-called Modern World emerges—like any new era—from a crisis, from a disappointment. The man 
who commences this world is disillusioned [un decepcionado]. He is a man who has encountered a world 
in which he does not fit. What was familiar to him has now become strange, clarity into obscurity, light 
into darkness. From henceforth, this man has set out to create clarity where only darkness is found; to 
search for “ideas clear and distinct.” Clarity is order and distinction. To order and distinguish are tasks 
the modern man sets for himself.23 
 
As Zea’s allusion to clarity and distinctiveness indicates, the foundations modern thought can be found in works 
like René Descartes's Discourse on the Method for Knowing for Rightly Using One's Reason in the World. For 
many decolonial theorists and philosophers like Zea, this work should be read as a response to the epistemic 
crises engendered by the encounter with a landmass in which (soon to be) modern man was out of place. The 
crisis that Zea has in mind is primarily epistemological. Modern man, or more generally “modernity,” is a 
byproduct of overcoming disillusionment and estrangement. Zea means disillusionment in the sense that 
scientific discoveries and the encounter with America made difficult the maintenance of dogmatic, traditional, 
faith-based, and unsophisticated ways of knowing that pervaded Christendom prior to the modern era. A new 
footing or anchor for the edifice of knowledge was required. Estrangement is meant in the sense that modern 
man is now alien to the world as it is. Like Christopher Columbus, he tries to make the world fit his image and 
understanding of it. In an incredible feat of the mind, modern man rearranges and organizes the world in ways 
that conform to his new way of seeing it (the move from “disappointment” to “deception,” from disappointed 
person to deceiver, to play on Zea's use of decepcionado). He therefore creates clarity and distinctiveness 
through his new method for knowing. 
Isaiah Berlin noticed something similar about the modern emphasis on method. “The positivist character of the 
new scientific movement,” he writes, concerned itself with the furtherance of knowledge for its own sake, the 
goal of which was “to accumulate knowledge, to know more than our predecessors and to be aware of this.” 
This desire, Berlin continues, “leads to the realisation that this can be achieved only if the reputable 
practitioners in the field recognise the validity of the same principles and methods and can test each other’s 
conclusions, as has been (and is) the case in physics or mathematics or astronomy and in all the new 
sciences.”24 “The new method . . . sought to eliminate everything that could not be justified by the systematic 
use of rational methods,” Berlin explains.25 The new method supplies normative conditions for what it means to 
be a knower, a project that embarks on the articulation of the “humanism” at the base of Western modernity’s 
inception and lays the foundation for philosophical hegemony, the normative commandeering of humanity's 
reasoning abilities. Put in the context of the epistemic injustice of colonialism, the emphasis on method that one 
finds with the advent of modernity is a direct response to, justification for, and taking on of the coloniality of 
knowledge and abyssal thinking, or so I contend. In this context, “modernity” is a response to the need for 
justifying the West's advancement and supposed superiority (again, the very same cultural milieu which is 
engaged in colonial violence on the other side of the hemisphere). 
Whereas the epistemic injustice of colonization represents limitation, enclosure, or the dwindling of humanity's 
epistemic resources, the decolonization of philosophy signals a process that makes room for other ways of 
knowing, a plurality of philosophical subjectivities and epistemic frameworks. It represents an expansion or 
opening that allows for other ways of being philosophical in the world to be possible, hopefully making room for 
the new humanity Fanon has in mind. The problem, however, is that trapped within pernicious forms of social 
identity—that is to say, starting from an objectified existence—or when forced to assume radical starting points 
that demonstrate how alternative or “Other” one’s viewpoint is, colonized voices often run the risk of 
reinforcing caricatures of precolonial thought or raising the bar of incommensurability and “radical 
difference/alterity” such that the conversation between cultures or traditions ends. Such a move forgets, as 
Lewis R. Gordon explained, there is more to reason than rationality. Whereas the latter cannot tolerate 
contradiction and is shaped by the invention of modern epistemology, especially in the guise of instrumental or 
mean-ends rationality, the former can tolerate ambiguity, contradiction, and even criticism of itself.26 Liberating 
reason, in this sense, requires overcoming what I term “epistemic despair”: the feeling that not only is one’s 
language or way of thinking a byproduct of the facticity of human existence but also the result of a colonial 
imposition, one that denigrated your “original” language and/or conceptual system and then supplanted it with 
another from which you are forever estranged; the realization of the possibility of being forever derivative 
regardless of however intelligent one might be; and the feeling that the price to pay for my usage of reason is 
the difference that is my-self. 
2 The Coloniality of Professional Philosophy 
For many professional philosophers, the mere suggestion that philosophy stands in need of decolonization is a 
thought that elicits controversy, confusion, contempt, and even resentment. After all, or so the claim goes, 
philosophy is one of the last bastions of reason-based inquiry, the type of thinking that, when compared to 
authority-driven, ideological, prescientific, or myth-based perspectives, should serve as the foundation for 
human social organization.27 While I agree with this claim in principle, the central worry driving this essay is the 
notion that not all people have the same relationship to reason, philosophical reason in particular. Do not get 
me wrong: I believe that all human beings, regardless of their race, religion, culture, nationality, sexuality, or 
gender, have more or less the same capacity to reason; reasoning is a critically reflective capacity inherent to 
human beings that is improved by teaching, training, and intellectual engagement. As mentioned above, there is 
also more to reason than rationality. Conflating the two strikes me as an overdetermination, one that all too 
quickly dismisses other aspects of human life and the mind that accompany reasoning processes (i.e., emotions, 
values, faith, and our embodied existence, and more). 
Nevertheless, the emphasis placed upon reason does not admit of equality of opportunity or equal access. To be 
more precise, embracing reason, especially in its more philosophical guise, does not exact the same toll out of 
every person or cultural grouping. Based on one’s relationship to a history of colonization, some people pay a 
steeper price when turning to reason, a price that is often alienating and leaves a person feeling derivative 
and/or inauthentic. Others, on account of their global privilege and relationship to Western modernity—which is 
really just another way of saying “based on their [positive] relationship to colonization”—pay a lesser price. For 
the latter, embracing reason entails strengthening the autonomy of the thinking-subject; for the former, the 
normative use of reason frequently entails a loss, the type of which I wish to describe in this section. This loss is 
strange since by embracing reason one might think that the move from the status of colonized object to reason-
based “subject” would be welcomed. However, as I argue below, unless philosophy is decolonized, the type of 
subjectivity formation that accompanies the philosophical process can be oppressive and, in some sense, de-
humanizing insofar as one has to give up the particularities of the self all the while philosophizing. In this sense, 
whereas Western philosophy might not officially be in the business of colonization, the coloniality of knowledge 
remains ever apparent. 
All human beings, one might argue, are forced to use the language(s), ideas, conceptual systems, and cultural 
mores of those that came before them in the search for individual meaning. Human self-consciousness takes 
place in a “cultural world,” to draw from Zea again, “created by others, by our fellow humans, a world with their 
religion, laws, customs, politics, economy, art and many other forms of expression, but a world in the making of 
which we have not participated, a world about which no one has been consulted, a world that never has to 
attend to our needs, desires, and dreams, yet nonetheless, a world that we have to accept as our own.”28 While 
the facticity of human existence is an unavoidable reality for all, the experience of colonization, especially from 
the perspective of the colonized, entails a more profound level of “thrownness” than what Zea describes; a 
second set of hurdles, so to speak, on the path of self-discovery. For not only is it the case that one is 
condemned to borrow from those that came before you, but because of the series of epistemic injustices that 
accompany it, a history of colonization imposes an additional barrier, a glass wall of sorts, that prevents one 
from finding a home in the cultural world they inherit. The master possesses all the tools and only allows one to 
use them. Worse, to have your own “tools” means you must create them from scratch, a starting point that, as 
Zea describes above, is untenable since we all start somewhere. All this is to say, “accepting the present as one’s 
own” is no easy task when the normative use of reason reflects the racial, gender, sexual, and even “colonial” 
hegemony afforded by abyssal thinking. 
In such a predicament, colonized peoples find themselves limited to “borrowing” from Western culture in ways 
that generate feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, and epistemic despair, what I explain as the feeling of having 
little control over one's relationship to reason and knowledge production. In his analysis, Bhargava describe this 
as the feeling of being “derivative,”29 the sense in which one is a poor copy or imitation of the West. Taking this 
further (and adding to what was described above), epistemic despair is a loss of hope in terms of speaking or 
thinking from a unique vantage point, or the feeling of having no other place to turn since no other language of 
thought or mode of expression is possible. Using Miranda Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical marginality, Linda 
Martín Alcoff articulated the feelings of alienation or estrangement that accompanies epistemic despair in the 
following way: “As a Latina in the academic world of North American philosophy, I regularly feel that, indeed, I 
have lost, or am in the process of losing, my marbles. Neither my general lived experience, nor my reference 
points in argumentation, nor my routine affective responses to events, nor my philosophical intuitions are 
shared with most people in my immediate milieu.”30 
By turning to Fricker's notion of hermeneutical marginality, a state of inequality viz-á-vis the creation of social 
meaning, Alcoff provides insight to the sense of frustration that accompanies epistemic despair. For Fricker, this 
inequality is produced by interpersonal and structural prejudices and gaps in the economy of collective 
hermeneutical resources.31 Medina defines “hermeneutical injustice” as the unfair epistemic treatment of a 
subject in regard to her intelligibility in communicative dynamics. He writes, “the subject is judged as 
unintelligible or less intelligible than other subjects; her words and meanings are not taken in their own terms, 
her capacity for meaning and understanding is undermined, and her agency in meaning-making and meaning-
expressing practices is compromised (if not eliminated altogether). [...] [W]hen a subject’s racialized language or 
accent is perceived as ignorant, less articulate or clear, less reliable or accurate, she is less likely to be asked 
questions that require cognitive sophistication, her interpretations and perspectives are less likely to be 
understood in her own terms, and she is more likely to be taken as unable to make full sense of certain areas of 
experience or to contribute to certain semantic domains.”32 
Reflecting on my own experience, I argue that epistemic despair goes deeper than “interpersonal and structural 
prejudices and gaps in the economy of collective hermeneutical resources.” It is not just an inequality or 
prejudice on account of ethnic or racial difference that drives the coloniality of knowledge. In this sense, 
colonized peoples are not necessarily lacking access to epistemic resources. As Bhargava explains, the colonizer 
is very generous in furnishing a plethora of categories and concepts for the colonized to think with (some might 
say overly generous). Neither is it the case that being recognized as an “equal” in terms of accessing epistemic 
resources within colonized contexts is the answer. All that would do is facilitate the assimilation of the colonized 
into the hegemonic viewpoint. The difficulty simultaneously resides in being forced to take up the perspective of 
the colonizer in ways that lead to feelings inauthenticity and alienation. It also lies in overcoming the 
methodological borders that deny individuals the ability to think from their own point of view. If Alcoff and 
myself assimilated into the “mainstream” and assumed the frame of reference that dominates professional 
philosophy, the feeling of loosing one's marbles, as she puts it, would not arise. Thus, bias against 
one's racial/ethnic or gender identity and difference is at best one of several other factors that 
generates feelings of alienation and exclusion. The fact that Alcoff wishes to think from her particular lived 
experience, interests, affective responses, and philosophical intuitions, and yet this is what is precisely is denied 
by hegemonic philosophical practice, reveals that it is not only who she is but how she thinks that is the 
problem. The normative use of reason demands that logos be race- and gender-free, or so the story goes. 
In comparison to other fields such as literature, sociology, or history, argues Charles Mills, philosophy aspires to 
ask perennial questions that place one on a discursive level where they can think alongside of the great minds of 
history: “Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from the contingent, the corporeal, the temporal, the 
material, to get at necessary, spiritual, eternal, ideal truths.”33 From a perspective that views philosophy as a 
universal science of thought, the range of questions that fall into its domain ought not include those lacking 
broad appeal. Questions devoted to race and processes of racialization, therefore, are of limited relevance to 
philosophers since they are “local,” particular, too corporeal (as it were), and mostly of interest to “minorities.” 
For Mills, a major reason for this type of marginalization experienced by people of color in philosophy is the fact 
that the hegemonic group of individuals traditionally associated with being “philosophers” lack the range of 
perspective or experiences often shared by people of color. To make matters worse, this group also inhabits 
positions of racialized normativity in philosophy. 
Using political philosophy as example, Mills argues that the experiential starting point for people of color, 
generally speaking (of course), runs contrary to the basic assumptions about political subjectivity maintained by 
most professional thinkers: “Your moral equality and personhood are certainly not recognized; you are not equal 
before the law; and the state is not seeking to protect but to encroach upon your interests in the interests of the 
white population.”34 In the contexts of the United States racial imaginary, African Americans are fundamentally 
viewed as criminal and dangerous, and the existence of Latinx peoples is predicated on tropes of “illegality.” 
While the rights of Blacks and Hispanics might be protected nominally, these protections are not automatically 
granted in our society but must be continuously fought for and asserted, a point that gives new meaning to the 
idea of racial privilege. All this is to say, a metaphysically stable and legally secure political subjectivity is 
something political philosophers can take for granted only when the class of individuals who make up 
professional philosophy are treated the same by the law, show up in similar ways in terms of political 
representation, and also share a similar range of normative concerns. Thus, when relying upon one’s (white 
racial) self as a frame of reference for discussion of rights or political organization, it is quite possible that, in 
academic contexts where a majority of peers inhabit more or less the same circle of privilege as you, the 
particularity of your view is obscured and the experience of “unraced” whites becomes the norm. 
Mills’s overall point is that many of the assumptions that “mainstream” philosophy rest upon reflect a rather 
particular perspective committed to a specific set of normative concerns. When this happens in the aggregate, 
adding things like prestige and pedigree, canon formation, the weight of tradition, and the “need for rigor” into 
the mix, one can easily see how many of those intellectual endeavors that might attract and welcome more 
nonwhite people into the philosophy are relegated to ethnic studies, area studies, women and gender studies, 
etc. 
It is important to underscore that what I am saying does not imply that philosophers of color are only interested 
in so-called projects of color nor is it the case that white philosophers altogether lack interest in any of the 
above concerns; many do work on and find such topics interesting. I also do not intend on suggesting that all 
minorities in philosophy think in essentialized ways that correspond with race, gender, or sexuality. To make 
such an assumption would be as oppressive and totalizing as the other injustices nonwhite philosophers put up 
with. Nevertheless, my concern is with those individuals who would argue that race, gender, or sexuality has 
nothing to do with philosophy or with those who dismiss the epistemic salience of social identity in philosophy 
altogether. This is precisely the feeling that Alcoff articulates above, one that stems from the sterilized method 
inherited from Western modernity. 
Connecting with the sections above, Bhargava's understanding of epistemic injustice, conjoined with Santos's 
abyssal thinking, allows me to extend my account of philosophy's colonization to the methodological 
abstractionism that undergirds most professional philosophical practice today. This abstractionism is at the root 
of feelings of alienation that make the mere “diversification” of philosophy inadequate. While attempts at 
increasing the number of women, people of color, and individuals from a wide range of gender expressions, 
sexual preferences, and varying degrees of ability into professional philosophy are important and worthwhile, 
these demographic shifts, by themselves, are not enough to disrupt the (geo-)politics of knowledge production 
or to bring about the decolonization of the field. 
The concern here is not merely with the numerical overrepresentation of whites that leads to the alienation of 
minorities in philosophy. Mills’s ultimate concern is with gatekeeping methodological constraints and “border-
building” tactics that simultaneously curtail the diversification of philosophy as well as obscure the 
particularity of those concerns passing themselves off as “universal.” Through this process, professional 
philosophy remains overpopulated by white people (men in particular) and dominated by white interests 
passing themselves off as raceless philosophical concerns. From here, philosophers of color not only have to 
confront implicit and explicit racial/gender biases, microaggressions, double standards, forms of tokenization, 
and outright hostility or animosity in professional philosophy, but also a series of metaphilosophical 
commitments and specific ideals about the end goal of philosophical thought that stifle any real engagement 
with diversity. 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Rafael Vizcaíno, Jasmine Wallace, and Jeong Eun Annabel We describe the situation 
as this: “In face of the eternal return of crisis and the perverse circle of Eurocentrism and white normativity, it 
becomes all the more necessary not simply to diversify philosophy, but to decolonise it.”35 For Maldonado-
Torres et al., decolonizing philosophy means “addressing the Eurocentrism and the white male heteronormative 
foundations of the field, as well as the attitudes, institutional orders and day-to-day practices that allow 
Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity to dominate the discipline.”36 Beyond the attitudinal, 
interpersonal, and structural practices that Maldonado-Torres et al. have in mind, there exist a series of 
methodological and metaphilosophical assumptions that allow Eurocentrism and white male heteronormativity 
to persist in philosophy. While some might suggest that these methodological and metaphilosophical 
assumptions are held nonconsciously, as even Foucault’s use of episteme suggests, I think academic 
philosophers quickly become aware of these assumptions and commitments when confronted by a claim to 
knowledge or philosophical practice that they disagree with. Addressing these methodological and 
metaphilosophical assumptions, as Mills suggests, would not only facilitate the diversification of professional 
philosophy, but insofar as its academic guise has some sway over the normative use of reason, this can help 
decolonize philosophy itself. 
As epistemic injustice, colonization robbed many non-Western peoples of historically derived cognitive 
resources and supplanted them with either the perspective of the colonizer or a series of inferiority complexes 
that perpetuate the coloniality of knowledge. In turn, the agents of reason, philosophers, become the primary 
authorities on matters connected to its usage. Their pronouncements become reason’s words. As such, they 
assume the mantle of mouthpiece and mind for all of humanity. This status grants philosophers the discursive 
breadth that allows their thought to transcend the confines of their particular time and place, thereby assisting 
in the construction of what Santos terms a “knowledge empire.” To say that philosophy needs to be 
decolonized, then, is to liberate reason, a task that requires a reconfiguration of humanity’s epistemic horizons 
and “the end of the cognitive empire.”37 Ending this empire means rethinking long-held assumptions and 
convictions about the locales, cultures, range of experience, and subjectivities from which philosophical thought 
emanates. I do not just mean the promotion of philosophy from the “post-” colonial world, but also a 
reconsideration of exceptionalism that undergirds Western philosophy, an exceptionalism derived in part from 
the false universalism afforded through conquest and cultural imposition. 
Ultimately, colonization robs the colonized of the ability to think for themselves. It does this by means of either 
replacement, as Bhargava explains, or by alienating the colonized from the language of thought itself, that is, 
reason. As epistemic injustice, colonization denies that the colonized can “think deeply,” where such profound 
contemplation is the byproduct of particularized standards articulated by the colonizer. Worse, this inability to 
think deeply is internalized and self-regulation kicks in. Once reason is colored (white), to embrace reason is to 
sell out, self-whiten, or assimilate. Altogether, the epistemic injustice of colonialism constitutes a form of 
heteronomy imposed from the outside (and to some extent within). 
Philosophy decolonized would allow individuals and communities to be themselves when engaged in 
philosophical reflection, that is to say, nonalienated philosophical practice. As Alfred explains, decolonization 
does not necessarily end with national independence or the achievement of statehood. Instead, as he notes, it is 
a process through which his sons can be more “Indian,” more Mohawk, than himself. Decolonization is not just 
diversification, but the creation of the cognitive infrastructure that allows subsequent generations to be more 
“Indian.” Put this way, decolonization is a lifelong and intergenerational endeavor that is about providing the 
conditions that make being indigenous or “Other” possible.38 Again, this does not mean the return to 
preconquest or precolonial ways of thinking, nor do I intend on dismissing those indigenous peoples alive and 
practicing their own forms of “philosophy” today. While alternative epistemologies and indigenous conceptual 
schemes are out there, escaping the gravitational pull and totalizing dimensions of Western colonialism, and 
being more oneself whilst philosophizing, is what decolonizing looks like. Decolonization, therefore, is not 
marked by a definitive point or the achievement of a specific bar but a process by which individuals and 
communities are free to think from their “own” point of view. While, as Zea notes, nobody begins from 
nowhere, the liberation of reason allows one to overcome internalized feelings of inferiority or inadequacy that 
accompany epistemic despair. Opening up humanity to other ways of being reasonable requires engagement 
with (and the embodiment of) difference. Yet, as I explain below, sometimes the engagement with difference 
can become ideological and reinforce the Western episteme rather than promote an episteme of difference. 
3 Comparative Philosophy as a Solution to Philosophy’s Colonization? 
In light of the above discussion, how does one traverse or “compare” philosophical traditions where histories of 
colonialism (and the persistence of coloniality) produce various forms of cultural, geopolitical, and economic 
asymmetry? How does one compare ideas, thinkers, and traditions across cultures without reinforcing Western 
philosophy's self-serving narrative of historical progress? Whereas I do not purport to offer an exhaustive list, 
this essay concludes by pointing toward some of what is necessary for comparative philosophy to assist in the 
decolonial struggle. 
Whereas most comparative efforts typically occur between “East” and “West,” ripe comparisons await 
exploration not only between the global North and South but also, and perhaps more importantly, from “South 
to South.” Insofar as one part of the historical justification for colonization was the denial of wisdom traditions 
and philosophical perspectives outside the West (or even the “East”), comparative efforts that move contrary to 
the sense of historical progress that undergirds Western philosophy’s self-understanding are attempts at 
rectifying the epistemic injustices of European colonialism. The radicalization of comparative philosophy 
requires dispensing with de facto conceptualizations of this subfield as consisting of “philosophy: East meets 
West.” I do not mean to dismiss or disregard comparative studies that juxtapose, for instance, Confucian 
thought and Aristotelian virtue ethics. Nevertheless, as a site of intellectual, linguistic and cultural interaction, 
“comparative philosophy” ought to be understood as more than just code for disciplinarily-vetted 
manifestations of “Asian philosophy.” There are a plethora of cultures, philosophical schools, and wisdom 
traditions throughout the global South awaiting comparison and investigation. 
The problem is, however, that taking such traditions seriously, especially in terms of analyzing their 
philosophical value, constitutes a political statement: it is to say, contrary to some of the most hallowed voices 
of the Western philosophical canon, that Africa is not a continent devoid of reason; that mestiza ways of 
knowing constitute real philosophy; that Nahuatl-speaking peoples, amidst the fact that some might have 
engaged in human sacrifice, were capable of practicing formal philosophical investigation. Not all comparative 
philosophers are willing to make such a statement. Indeed, many have investment in a specified directionality 
when it comes to their comparative efforts. As a consequence, and in effort to avoid such politicized gestures, 
comparative endeavors often tread within the confines of preestablished and well-paved philosophical 
crossroads offered by self-styled understandings of the historical development of Western thought. Moreover, 
such efforts are rewarded by escaping the types of criticism levied against those comparisons that not only 
move beyond the horizontal binary of “East meets Eest” but also traverse time, as is the case when studying a 
tradition long covered over by histories of colonization and laden with the types of concerns engendered by 
having to contend with “modernity” from the perspective of its underside, that is, coloniality. Whereas for some 
peoples time is an asset, which is why the ancient wisdom traditions of the East are so fascinating to many, for 
others it results in totalization or a historicized existence. 
Because indigenous epistemic frameworks have been hollowed out in ways Bhargava described above, they are 
often and easily reduced to the status of “worldviews” (mere Weltanschauung), “life philosophies,” “sage 
knowledge,” or even “myth,” anything but refined, critical, reflective, and creative thought. Besides challenging 
the exceptionalism and epistemological hubris that one typically finds in colonizing cultures, decolonizing an 
epistemic framework requires an incredible amount of reconstruction, re-valuation, and, to some extent, the 
“dis-covering” of colonized ways of thinking. In Bhargava’s words, 
It is doubtful if “original epistemic frameworks” can ever be recovered. There is a sense in which there is 
no going back to pure indigenous cultures because every rediscovery is at least partly a reinvention. We 
know that every revival of a tradition has turned out to be its reinvention. Restoration may be possible 
for cultural artefacts that are physically embodied, but for artefacts such as conceptual frameworks that 
are largely disembodied, this is extremely difficult. Yet the slow, painstaking process of a partial recovery 
of the voice and history of the colonized can begin by putting together and reinterpreting traces of 
evidence and meaning present in largely forgotten texts.39 
 
As important as such reconstructions might be, they are vulnerable to multiple forms of criticism, especially in 
terms of the authenticity of their representation of colonized views. “Is that really how the Aztecs thought?” or 
“Might there be aspects of Incan culture that we do not fully grasp?” are the types of questions one frequently 
encounters when resuscitating a tradition long colonized and covered over. Here, the move is not one of true 
engagement, but an attempt to undercut such comparative endeavors. 
Rather than engage in these kind of battles, comparative efforts should be appreciated for their decentering and 
displacing capabilities. Embarking on debates about the authenticity of the viewpoint presented serves little use 
and casts doubt on the entire field of study. It is a tactic used to obviate engagement with the philosophical 
Other altogether. Instead, I suggest, how does the tradition as it is presented challenge preconceived notions 
about the nature of philosophy, truth, beauty, life, death, etc.? As Eduardo Mendieta writes, “The possibility of 
and need for a Latin American philosophy is a meta-philosophical question, one that puts the very forms of 
crystallization of philosophy in jeopardy not just in Latin America, but also in the Western world.”40 My point is 
that comparative endeavors should be a bit more charitable when dealing with a tradition that been devasted 
by the reality of colonization. Rather than pick it apart, the first move should be to examine what challenges it 
presents. In part, this is why certain types of comparisons are welcomed more than others. Professional 
philosophers seek out diverse viewpoints, but only insofar as they do not disrupt the philosophical status quo. 
To put this differently, most of what passes for “comparative philosophy” challenges Western thought in ways 
permitted by Western thinkers: the move from orthodoxy to orthopraxy; from essentialist, substantialist, or 
static metaphysics to process ontologies; from philosophy as love of wisdom to contemplative and esoteric 
understandings of “philosophy”; and more. All of these take place within a range of intellectual development in 
which, although different enough to make possible points of differentiation, there remain enough overlap such 
that comparisons can be made. When confronted with “radical difference,” the type of difference that runs 
counter to the narrative of historical development, one can start to view the dangers and risks involved in 
comparative endeavors. 
In the wrong hands, the reconstructions that Bhargava has in mind run the risk of overlying upon essential 
formulations, exotified notions, or romanticized ideals. To make matters worse, the reconstruction of 
indigenous philosophies or epistemic frameworks typically requires that one upend historical narratives that 
colonizing cultures, especially the West, depend upon. Acknowledging the advanced reasoning skills of tribal 
peoples necessarily undermines the narrative of historical progress that undergirds Western culture, a narrative 
that subsumes indigenous peoples into “universal” (read European) history. Vine Deloria Jr. put it this way: 
Tribal people have traditionally been understood by Westerners as the last remnants of a hypothetical 
earlier stage of cultural evolution, and this so-called “primitive stage” of human development is a 
necessary preamble to any discussion of human beings and the meaning of their lives. Indeed, the 
stereotype of primitive peoples anchors the whole edifice of Western social thought. We need the 
primitive so that we can distinguish Western civilization from it and congratulate ourselves on the 
progress we have made.41 
 
Part of the stereotypic image Deloria has in mind is that of native peoples as closer to the earth or more in tune 
with nature. From “modern” Western points of view, alternative knowledge systems and ontologies, for 
instance those that are grounded in myth and assign agency to nonhuman animals or even the environment, 
reinscribe the image of native peoples as more simplistic and perhaps even “savage” and premodern. While 
indigenous ways of knowing might have actually be more “pantheistic” and not predicated on the subject/object 
divide that allows for the exploitation and denigration of nature, the ideals of civility and “culture” depended 
upon images of savagery, laziness, and backwardness or lack of historical progress, all of which were 
conveniently identified in the ways of living and knowing of non-European/indigenous peoples. Amy Allen refers 
to this as “progress as a ‘fact,’” a backwards-looking sense of historical progress “bound up with complex 
relations of domination, exclusion, and silencing of colonized and racialized subjects.”42 
As an example, take Miguel León-Portilla’s seminal La filosofía náhuatl (1956) in which he used the hallowed and 
revered Western category of “philosophy” to describe the critical reflective capacities of the group of people 
often referred to as the Aztecs, and thereby “brought upon himself a firestorm of calumny and condemnation,” 
as Jim Maffie put it.43 This type of philosophical recovery stirred the ire of those who are invested in the 
primitive status of indigenous peoples. How could these savages and heathens, who worship a feathered 
serpent and practiced human sacrifice, be said to practice philosophy? In light of this controversy, the English 
translation of León-Portilla’s book became Aztec Thought and Culture: A Study of the Ancient Nahuatl 
Mind (1963).44 Notice the absence of “philosophy.” 
How is it that under the guise of “non-Western philosophy,” Asian philosophical traditions escape the above 
traps? How does the practice of comparative philosophy, when falling in line with the movement and trajectory 
of world history, perpetuate such ways of thinking? Before I continue, however, let me be clear. I realize that 
many of the same debates regarding whether or not “Asian thought” satisfies the bar of Eurocentric 
conceptualizations of philosophy often plague contemporary comparative endeavors. Comparative endeavors 
that move Eastward face much intellectual prejudice and suffer from forms of cultural chauvinism, perennialism, 
exoticism, and orientalism. Nevertheless, and this is my point, the idea of “Asian philosophy” fits more readily 
within, and I would add reifies, the supposed historical development of Western culture. Professional 
philosophical practice is not problematized as easily or provoked as much by the inclusion of Asian thinkers into 
the mainstream. Why? 
Part of the answer is due to the fact that Asia, especially the far East, maintains a different colonial relationship 
with the West as do the Americas. Zea writes “We do not feel, as Asians do, the heirs of our own autochthonous 
culture.” He continues, “There was, yes, an indigenous culture—Aztec, Maya, Inca, etc.—but this culture does 
not represent, for us contemporary Latin Americans, the same thing that ancient Oriental cultures represents for 
contemporary Asians.” Speaking in broad terms, Zea explains that the colonial impositions placed upon Asia 
were primarily technological, a point that an expert on colonialism in the East might take issue with. In the 
Americas, however, colonization was not limited to material, technological impositions. Instead, one confronts a 
complete and thorough colonization, one of both body and mind. Throughout the Americas, 
colonization eliminated or denigrated indigenous cultures altogether. There is no, or little, historical continuity 
of culture such that one can “compare” traditions without generating the dismisive skeptism noted above. This 
is not to say that elements of pre-contact culture do not exist or that there are no indigenous peoples left. But 
from within the point of view Zea is referencing, the lack of cultural continuity poses a serious problem to cross-
cultural comparison. One can study classics in the Confucian tradition, for example, without having to constantly 
prove that such a rich history of thought existed. As León-Portilla’s case demonstrates, such is not the case when 
doing Aztec philosophy.  
This is not to say, however, that engagement with Asian or Eastern traditions is problem free. I have seen and 
heard arguments made in favor of hiring specialists in "Asian philosophy" on account of it being “religiously” 
inspired and capable of promoting “spirituality” without the traps of organized religion. From this point of 
view, “Eastern” traditions conveniently blur the line between religious, mystical, and philosophical knowledge 
(or so they do from Western eyes). Such a way of thinking, without a doubt, is obviously the product of much 
orientalism and cultural exotification. Thus, even while “included,” rarely are these inclusions cost free.  
And yet, neither do they come without benefit. Comparing “Eastern” traditions with Indigenous American, 
African, or some other “postcolonial” perspective runs the risks of sullying, perhaps even dragging down, the 
tradition one seeks to uplift. To this day, the idea of philosophy evokes a certain aura of sophistication and 
elitism. “Philosophy” commands a certain level of veneration, one that historically served as an effective means 
of measuring the supposed advancement of Western culture. To compare Eastern philosophy to, say, Nahuatl 
thought runs the risk of lumping the two traditions together, and if the latter’s status as real philosophy is 
dubious, why should one use it as a comparable frame of reference for the former? Another reason why I think 
pay attention to the directionality of philosophical comparisons yields interesting insights about the coloniality 
of knowledge. Diversity initiatives in professional philosophy do not often have in mind the promotion of what I 
term epistemes of difference. The promotion of epistemes of difference, which can be achieved by broadening 
the range of perspective typically at play in comparative endeavors, in addition to recognizing (for lack of a 
better word) the epistemic salience of things such as race, gender, sexuality, the intersection of these and more, 
leads to the creation of a variety of different ways of being philosophical in the world. 
I view the decolonization of philosophy as the expansion or broadening of the range of perspective from which 
philosophical reflection can take place. By suggesting a new landscape for the philosophical anthropology at the 
heart of philosophical practice, it heralds the possibility of rigorous philosophical knowledge arising from 
multiple subjectivities, cultures, and locales throughout the world, not all of which depend upon the alienating 
and imperial methodological constraints that make possible “Western” thought. Once decolonized, philosophy 
(and philosophers) strives to find points of view and ways of thinking different from itself, a plurality of ways of 
using reason in the world rather than a reduction or simplification of ways of knowing. Enrique Dussel refers to 
this as pluriversal reason.45 In light of a lingering skepticism about whether or not transcultural meanings exist, 
comparative philosophers are better off gaining a sense for how the comparative process challenges one’s 
preconceived views for what constitutes philosophy in the first place. Comparative philosophy, when performed 
well, ought to assist more in decentering or destabilizing the self rather than understanding the Other, as 
counterintuitive as this might seem to those who are committed to a global philosophical community. While I do 
not mean to obviate the importance of or dismiss the possibility of cross-cultural communication, one 
jeopardizes the significance of this methodological approach if they seek to get inside the mind of “the Other.” 
This act of decentering displaces “the self” in the hopes of providing space for the Other. In a more decolonized 
setting, not only would qualifiers such as “African,” “Latin American,” or “Amerindian” make sense in front of 
the word “philosophy,” but also such things as race, gender, sexuality, and more would become epistemically 
salient since these have been axes of domination through which the coloniality of knowledge occurs. In short, 
the decolonization of philosophy—an idea that signifies more of a process rather than an easily achievable 
goal—occurs when being a woman, or nonwhite, or gay, for that matter, acquires value within the philosophical 
process. In saying this, I do not mean to make a spectacle or objectify one's racial, gender, or sexual difference 
by assuming all women, all Black people, or all lesbians think in essentialized ways. Instead, the decolonization 
of philosophy will allow one to be themselves whilst philosophizing, particular those persons who fall outside 
the range of the dominant hegemonic group of persons typically viewed as philosophers. Returning to Alfred, it 
allows one to be more “Indian” when philosophizing. 
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